

INTRODUCTION

During the recent years privatization of public enterprises has been widely suggested by the multilateral financial agencies as a part of the structural adjustment programs. Thus, in the implementation of their adjustment some countries of Latin America and the Caribbean are now studying or starting to implement a privatization program.

The experience of some countries in the divestment of public enterprises, mostly developed ones, like the United Kingdom and France have been widely publicized. Less known have been the results of the divestment of public firms in developing countries.

Thus, it could be of interest for the economies that are entering in a process of disengagement of public enterprises, to know what has been the experience of a country similar to them. It is in this light that this paper will present some aspects of the process and economic implications of the Mexican privatization program.

The definition of privatization that is considered in this paper is "all public sector reforms that lead to transfer to the private sector the operational responsibility of a public enterprise. Not only through the asset divestment, but the concession or subcontracting of services to the private sector."

¹ This definition is used by Devlin (1991).

The transfer of public sector activities to the private sector has been promoted on the following grounds:

- 1) public enterprises are inefficient, since politicians interfere with their operations and they are inadequately monitored; managers are poorly motivated and badly paid. Labor unions are very powerful.
- 2) The inefficiency of the enterprises, in turn, leads to increasing fiscal deficits, given the need to subsidize these institutions.
- 3,) Because of its contribution to the reduction of fiscal deficits, privatization will help to stabilize the economy, decrease inflationary pressures, and through the reduction of private sector uncertainty, it will contribute to increase investment and future output growth.
- 4) With the resources released from the divestment of public enterprises, the government can satisfy better their compromises: provision of pure public goods and help the poorest through special social programs.

Generally, privatization is recommended on efficiency grounds and because it will increase the possibility of a successful stabilization, but one of the aspects that has not been adequately analyzed is the impact that the divestment of public enterprises will have or has had in the past on economic policies being pursued by the government.

This paper will focus mainly on the impact that the disengagement of public sector firms may have on the

· implementation of the fiscal and monetary policies. For this purpose the 1982-1991 Mexican privatization program is analyzed.

The paper is organized in three parts: the first is a general framework of what is considered a successful divestment program, and the problems it can face. In this context, the rules followed under the Mexican program are analyzed. The second part is the analysis of the privatization in Mexico and its impact on the main economic policies. The third includes final considerations and conclusions.

I - BACKGROUND

a) General framework

It has been considered that a successful privatization should transfer public ownership of the firm to the private sector, at a reasonable price that reflects the real value of the asset, without incurring in any hidden subsidy to buyers, such as absorbing net losses of the enterprise sold.²

This is so because the divestment of public enterprises is generally undertaken to fulfill two principal objectives: improve efficiency in the allocation of resources and heal government finances. Thus, if the government takes the losses of the firm on itself or gives any special subsidy, these costs must be deducted from the final price. In this way, it will be clear what are the real proceeds from the sale of the firm, and in how much they are going to help in reducing the budget deficit.

Regarding the market value of the enterprise, it is very difficult to know from the book value of the firm. Thus, external evaluation has to be done previously. Anyway, some problems can arise given the small financial markets of developing countries, and the existence of externalities in almost all public enterprises.

It is important to implement the program when the economy is stable or near so, especially when large firms are on sale. It is so because an unstable macroeconomic environment can have a

²See for example Devlin (1991), and Cordoba (1991).

depressing effect on the price of the enterprise and on the number of buyers that are going to bid for them. In general, it has been found that economic stability is linked to higher prices and more efficient outcomes from the sale of public enterprises.

Other problems that must be taken into account when the privatization program is analyzed before its implementation, are which are the enterprises that must be deregulated previously to its divestment and which are those that will need a special regulation, assuming that they are natural monopolies or monopolies in a relatively closed economy.

In these cases, experience in other countries shows that the regulations have to be in place before the program is enacted, and some trade liberalization has to be done, in such a way that newly privatized enterprises face a more competitive environment. Thus, there are several measures that have to be carefully planned and implemented before or at the same time the privatization takes place.

The above mentioned problems make a case for analyzing independently each large enterprise before making any decision for divestment. All the problems have to be seriously considered, such as market imperfections, workers' productivity, management, suppliers, protection the firm has enjoyed in the past, and other problems it can face. It means that in the

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To this regard see for example Valenzuela (1988) and Cordoba (1991).

privatization of these important firms all relevant cost and benefits must be taken into account.

The faster it is done, the larger the probability of making serious mistakes that could lead again to an involuntary nationalization of the firm, like some of the first privatized Chilean enterprises. Furthermore, the faster the transaction of the firm is done, the cheaper the final sale price, since buyers will demand a discounted price, decreasing the income of the government.

b) The Mexican experience

In this context, the Mexican divestment program fulfilled most of these requirements. For example, it was not made in a very short period of time. The privatization process started in 1983 with the sale of some small firms, to gain some experience and understanding, at a low cost, for the sale of larger enterprises. It was considered that an accelerated program could improve efficiency and resources allocation but at the cost of a decline in potential income to the Government from the sale.

At the beginning of the process, between 1983 and 1985 some enterprises were liquidated, since they were not viable, and only were in operation because of Government transfers. Others were merged, to take advantage of a larger scale capacity, as well as of complementarity in production systems, and to save in distribution and marketing techniques. Besides, a few firms were

transferred to local governments when they were considered important for regional development.

The sale of the largest enterprises started in 1988: Some mines and steel industries have been sold, as well as the airlines, the telephone company and now the commercial banks.

The experience with the sale of these large firms were not all successful. For example, the privatization process of "Mexicana de Aviación", is not very clear. The divestment was made with an increase in the capital stock of the firm. The proceeds from the sale were 149 million dollars, that were used to buy the new planes required by the airline, and none of them went to the Government Treasury. Thus, the Government gifted the major share of the Airline and its administration to the private sector, keeping a minor participation.

This is a special case. The process of divestment of almost all the other enterprises was generally well managed. In this regard, special mention deserves the sale of the commercial banks, that have been transacted at prices far above their book values.

It is important to point out that in some of these larger enterprises, such as the telephone company, the Government has kept a minor participation in their capital. The idea is to sell these shares in the future at a higher price than the one received from the sale of the first stock package.

Some features of the mexican program deserve to be highlighted as valuable tools for the implementation of a program of this kind:

- a) To avoid internal and external pressures on the divestment of the enterprise, as soon as its privatization has been decided, the Minister of Finance, is designed President of its Board of Directors. On the other hand, the responsibility of the divestment process is given to a commercial bank.
- "b) In response to the recommendation of an external and independent accounting firm the book value of the asset is adjusted to its market value, previous to the privatization. The prices and tariffs of the firm's products are adjusted, eliminating the subsidies they enjoyed.

Besides, in general, all the problems faced by the enterprises have been clearly specified in the sale contract and, if it is possible, solved before the transaction takes place. In Mexico, a specific capital share of some privatized firm, around 4 or 5%, has been sold to their workers with special loans granted to them on an individual basis, particularly it was done in the case of the Mexican Telephone Company.

There is an experience with the selling of a copper mine (CANANEA), where the union was too powerful, and the labor problems were not solved prior to the privatization. Thus, the selling price was very cheap according to the copper reserves (1,700 million tons) and assets of the firms, but until now since,

the divestment of the mine it has suffered continuous strikes and it is practically not operating.

c) A bidding system is used to ensure that everyone interested in an enterprise has been informed of the sale, as well as to ensure that the sale price of the firm is the best that can be obtained in the market.

For concerned investors, a brochure is available with all the relevant information about the firm upon request and a previous deposit.

All bidders concerned are carefully screened to guarantee that the firm will be entitled to a reliable investor, besides of being the highest bidder. For example, with this method, the Government ensured that some commercial banks were bought by regional groups, hence not all bank owners were in Mexico City.

This bidding system has been very successful in getting very attractive prices for the largest enterprises, such as the telephone company and commercial banks.

- d) To avoid speculation and ensure long-term commitment from buyers, a clause is introduced in the sale contract specifying that the investor can not sell the company before a given date.
- e) Regarding the regulation of natural monopolies specific measures have been implemented. For instance, one year before the privatization of the Mexican telephone company, the Bylaw of the concession of the company was modified to favor a more competitive market structure, since it originally stipulated that this corporation was the single provider of public telephone

services. Besides, authorization was given to operate advanced telecommunications equipment such as telefax, switchboards, multilinear units, etc. without previous authorization.

Furthermore, the concession specifies detailed for standard services that should be met by the buyers, and regulations regarding the tariffs which have a ceiling in real terms related to a basket of basic telephone services. It also includes details about the investment program to be followed by the Company the next 10 years.

Similarly, before the privatization of commercial banks, the regulatory framework for financial services was adapted to the new conditions under which banks are going to operate. Thus, a package of six laws for commercial banks and "credit auxiliaries" was enacted on July 1990.

- f) To guarantee that the major share of capital remains with mexicans, the participation of foreigners is limited. For example, foreign participation in a multiple banking institution is limited to 30 per cent, and control must be exertised by Mexican shareholders.
- g) One unintended by product of the divestment program has been an increase in market imperfections and skewed income distribution, since most of the enterprises have been acquired by private conglomerates that were previously operating on the fields of the newly privatized enterprise. Hence, privatization has complemented oligopolies or monopolies helping *them to

integrate vertically or horizontally. Only thirteen enterprises has been sold to "social sectors" (unions and cooperatives).

The main measure adopted to force competition into the market and avoid undesirable monopolistic practices is trade liberalization. Since late 1987, the average tariff rate was reduced to less than 10%, and the maximum import tariff is 20%. On the other hand, approximately 3% of the import tariff is subject to quantitative control.

II - EVOLUTION OF THE MEXICAN PROGRAM

a) Evolution of the program

The public sector in Mexico expanded very quickly during the 1970s, from 391 enterprises in 1970 to 1155 in December 1982. Nevertheless, the share in GNP of these enterprises was only 17 per cent in the latter year. At the outset of the financial crisis, Mexico shifted its priority regarding the involvement that the public sector should have in the economy.




CHART 1

The Government decided to implement a divestment program that has been very drastic. The number of firms in the hands of the Government was reduced from 1155 in 1982 to 247 in

October 1991. Chart 1 illustrates the magnitude of the reduction in public administration.

Table 1 presents details of the evolution of the public sector from December 1982 to December 1990. It is worth noting the sharp reduction in "Firms with Minor State Participation" in 1986. This drop can be attributed to the legal disposition included in the 1986 Law of Parastate Enterprises, which specifies that the enterprises with minor state participation are not longer included under the public administration, even if the State participates in their capital.

Table 1
MEXICO: EVOLUTION OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR
December 1982 - December 1990

	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
Decentralized Institutions	102	97	95	96	94	94	89	88	82
Firms with Majo State Particip.		700	703 .	. 629	528	437	252	229	147
State Trust Funds	231	199	173	147	108	83	71	62	= 51
Firms with Mino State Particip.	==	78	78 `	69	7	3	0	0	0
TOTAL	1155	1074	1049	941	737	617	412	379	280

Source: Unidad de Desincorporación de Entidades Paraestatales.

⁴⁴⁰ firms and 8 State trust fund were not included anymore as public entities because of this resolution.

On the other hand, in Table 1 it is also noticeable that at the beginning of the process, it was not clear what were the main objectives of the Government with the privatization, since 61 new public enterprises weree created, mostly on social areas (health, education, culture, and entertainment).

In October 1991 there were 984 parastate enterprises authorized to be liquidated or privatized, and in 867 #cases the process was totally completed. As it is shown in Table 2, only 268 firms were sold, most of the cases are liquidations and extinctions.

Table 2
MEXICO: PUBLIC ENTERPRISES DIVESTMENT PROCESS
October 1991

·	No.	of Firms	
Sold		268	
Liquidated		263	•
Merged		82	
Transferred . Extinguished		32 151	7
Firms with minor State participation*		71	- =
Total disassociated		867	
		0.45	
Actual Public Enterprises		247	
In Process of Privatization		117	
TOTAL		1231	•

^{*}These enterprises were disengaged according to the Bylaw of Federal Parastatal Enterprises, that exclude from the Public Sector the firms with minor State Participation.

Source: Comisión Intersecretarial de Gasto-Financiamiento, Unidad de Desincorporación de Entidades Paraestatales, Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público (SHCP).

b) Impacts on macroeconomic variables

Regarding the impact of the privatization on the main macroeconomic variables there are two periods— clearly differentiated, one from 1983 to 1988, and the second from 1989 until the present. In the first one, the path was very slow, thus the impact on the economy was quite moderate. On the contrary, the second period has been characterized by the fast steps that have been undertaken; and the structural modification of the public sector, affecting the whole economy, mainly fiscal and monetary policies.

b.1) Period 1983-1988

According to Secretaria de la Contraloria (1988) during the first period (1983-1988) public enterprises in the process of privatization accounted for a very small share of public sector GDP, only 2.9%, and if the production of PEMEX (Mexican Petroleum) is not included, this share increased to 10.5 per cent.

On the other hand, the decline in public enterprise GDP from 1984 to 1988 was only 4.5 per cent in real terms, but all the fall should not be attributed to the divestment process, since 1986 and 1987 were years of severe recession in the country.

Nevertheless, the impact on sectoral accounts of the divestment process is quite considerable, for example: the mines and extractive operations other than oil and gas are reduced in

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29.6 per cent; in manufactures other than oil, the reduction is 31.5 per cent, including the total withdrawal of the Government from the production of durable consumer goods, as well as from some non-durables, such as non-alcoholic beverages, processed food, textiles and medicines. It also withdrew from the production of automobiles, some intermediate inputs and capital goods, such as turbines, metallic structures and non-electric machineries. Besides it considerably reduced its participation in the tourism sector.

According to the classification of the Mexican Industrial Census, until November 30, 1988 the Government withdrew from 22 economic branches, and was in process of retiring from another four.

The impact on employment of the privatization has not been so high, since the firms that were closed down were relatively small in size, except three big ones: a steel industry (Fundidora Monterrey) with nearly 9,043 employees; Uramex (Mexican uranium) with 2,549; and a textile industry (Ayotla Textil) with 1,690 workers.

On the other hand, according to the Production Accounts of the Public Sector published by INEGI, from 1984 to 1988 there was a decline of 25,200 workers from public enterprises. This reduction was mostly in employment in manufacturing industries that declined by 32.7 per cent, which means a reduction of 77,618 employees in 4 years. This fall can be mostly attributed to the divestment process. Furthermore, there were only two additional

sectors where employment decreased in the public sector during this period, finance, insurance and real state that fell 3.5 per cent, and agriculture that had a marginal decline (0.26 per cent).

It should be pointed out that the reduction in public sector employment does not mean a decrease in total employment in the economy, since most of the enterprises were sold to the private sector, that have kept the firms in operation. Hence, where have only been a transfer of workers from one sector to the other.

Regarding the impact of the privatization on the government budget, the reduction from parastate sector annual income was on average 0.39% from 1984 to 1988, while according to President De la Madrid (1988) the subsidies to the public industries were cut from 2.5 per cent of GDP in 1983 to 1.3 per cent in 1988, due mainly to the privatization process. According to those figures there has been a net gain in efficiency and savings in the public sector from the divestment of firms.

On this respect, Casar and Perez (1988), found that up to 1987 around 75 per cent' of privatized enterprises or in divestment process were created by the private sector and later transferred to the public sector because of financial problems. They also found that around 60 per cent of the liquidated firms were created by the public sector.

It is shown in Table 3, that the proceeds from the sale have had very little impact on the Government budget during the period

analyzed, since it was only during the year 1988 that the income accounted for 2.8 per cent of the economic fiscal deficit (including payment of nominal interest on the public debt). From 1983 to 1987 the proceeds were below one percentage point of said deficit, thus its contribution to the improvement of the budget imbalances was almost negligible.

Table 3

MEXICO: PROCEEDS FROM THE SALE OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES

1983-1988

(BillionS of Mexican Pesos)

Year	Sale Proceeds	Economic Deficit	% of Economic Deficit
1983	4.85	1,455.0	0.33
1984	0.21	2,105.8	0.01
1985	29.18	3,808.9	0.77
1986	61.59	11,804.8	0.52
1987	229.06	29,060.6	0.79
1988	1,180.81	42,479.3	2.78

Source: Data from sale proceeds: Unidad de Desincorporación SHCP, Economic Deficit: Nacional Financiera, La Economía Mexicana en Cifras 1990.

b.2) <u>Period 1989-1991</u>

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As it can be seen in Chart 2 below, the divestment process from December 1988 to October 1991 has disengaged from the public sector 272 enterprises, 31.4 per cent of the total (867 at October 1991).

Nevertheless, it has represented 96.4 per cent of the total income from the proceeds of the sale, 41.95 trillion mexican




CHART 2

pesos, since the process started in 1982. The huge amounts that have been collected from the sale of 8 commercial banks and the Telephone Company has meant to the Government approximately a net income of 11.3 billion US dollars, enough to have a surplus in the budget in 1991.

In Table 4 the value of the receipts from the sale of the public firms from 1989 to October 1991 are displayed. They are compared to some economic indicators, in such a way to get some

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notions about the magnitude of the privatization during these three years.

It is evident from the table, that 1990 and 1991 were the two years where the income from the process was big enough to have important repercussions on economic policies. For example, in 1990 (the first time the proceeds from the sale were an important part of the reduction in the economic fiscal deficit), it amounted to roughly 35 per cent of the financial requirements of the public sector. Precisely, because of the size of the revenue collected in 1990, this deficit declined to 2.3 per cent of GDP from 4.9 per cent in the previous year.

Table 4

MEXICO: SALE OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES AND SOME ECONOMIC INDICATORS

1989 - 1991

(Billions of Mexican pesos)

	1989	1990	1991
Sale Proceeds	1,798.6	9,017.2	29,630.7
GDP -	516,710.4	668,691.1	819,146.61
Financial Requirements of		·	
the Public Sector	29,379.0	25,395.0	7
Economic Deficit	25,268.0	15,529.0	-17,245.02
Sales as % of GDP	0.34%	1.35%	3.6
Sales as % of Fin. Requirements	6.1%	35.5%	

Estimated taking the rate of growth of GDP as 4.5% and inflation as 18%.

Sources: Unidad de Desincorporación de Empresas Paraestatales, Bank of Mexico, and Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público.

b.2.1) Main effects on Economic Performance

1991 has been a record year in terms of the divestment

² Surplus January-June 1991.

to 29.63 trillion Mexican pesos (around 9.87 billion US dollars), which is equivalent to around 70 per cent of total receipts from the disengagement of public firms. For the Government finances it has meant a historical surplus in the budget during the first semester of the year amounting to 17.2 trillion Mexican pesos.

Thus, the contribution of the funds from privatization to the good economic performance of the current administration has been very important, mostly helping to restore private sector confidence in the Government economic program. Furthermore, this new source of funds to the Government allowed a reduction of its presence in the financial market, contributing to a decline in interest rates, and an increase in the availability of credit to the private sector. The lower interest rates, in turn, have created a virtuous cycle, reducing the pressure on the public domestic debt service and helping to reduce inflationary pressures.

Chart 3 shows the decline in Government Treasury bills (CETES) and in annual average inflation, by quarters, starting in January 1989. It is clear that the decrease in Cetes' interest rates accelerated since the second quarter of 1990. The effects of this fall is more important, if it is taken into account that this is the leading interest rate in the country. Inflation, in turn, started to decline again since the first quarter of 1991.

To relate the drop in inflation and the recovery of private sector confidence in the economy to the divestment process, Table 5 below will be used. This table exhibits the causes of changes




CHART 3

in M1 by quarters for the period 1989-1990.

It shows that during the first quarter of 1989 the main cause of the variation of M1 were changes in the monetary base. In turn, the principal motive leading to the fluctuation in this latter aggregate was the "financing to the public sector" that accounted for 155 per cent of this movement. The importance of this financing for the variation of M1 declined very rapidly during the remaining period and, at the end of 1990, it was reduced to a minor factor in the fluctuation of this monetary aggregate. This reduced Government demand for financing is largely attributed to the proceeds of the privatization.

Table 5
CAUSES OF CHANGES IN M1
(Changes in Percentage relative to last year) 1

		1989 QU	ARTERS		1990 QUARTERS			
	I	II	III	VI	I		III	IV
Changes in M1	41.2		23.3	30.6	40.1	50.5	44.8	64.
Due to:		`						
Multiplier	11.2	36.9	32.7	22.5	38.0	24.2	16.7	25.
-Changes in Currence ratio -Changes in Checks/	0.0	-0.5	0.0	0.8	2.3	4.4	3.8	3.:
Total Deposit rati -Changes in effecti	o 2.1	-3.2	-3.3	-3.3	-1.5	6.3	1.7	14.0
banking reserves -Residual	9.2 -0.1			23.6	44.5 -7.2		11.5 -0.3	
Monetary Base	31.6	-12.6	-7.7	7.0	-1.1	26.6	28.9	37.
-Financing to the Public Sector -Financing to the	155.2	142.3	84.9	48.4	46.5	66.0	33.8	14.
Financial Sector -Other domestic	0.1	-0.3	-1.2	-3.1	-4.1	1.2	5.4	9.
financing	-4.5	-20.9	-32.1	-46.1	-57.8	-65.6	-45.9	-38.
-Net Foreign Assets	-119.2	-133.7	-59.3	7.8	14.3	.25.0	35.6	5-2.

Weighted average, based on current balance at the end of the month.
NOTE: A negative sign indicates a contracting effect on the aggregates.

Source: Bank of Mexico, Informe Anual 1990.

Two comments should be made before further analysis. First, after a period of high inflation the currency ratio as well as the checks/total deposit ratio of the multiplier must be very low, reflecting that people prefer to save in other assets rather than in domestic currency, given their expectations about its future value.

Besides, in a couuntry with a heavy foreign debt, where the Government has to make large external transfers in payment of the debt service, the uncertainty about the future value of the exchange rate is very high. Given the risks of devaluation it could be expected that people keep their money in foreign currency and, therefore, that net foreign assets should be very low and declining.

"Both of the above mentioned factors were affecting the Mexican economy during the period 1982-1988. Thus, after a situation of high inflation and great macroeconomic uncertainty, an increase in the three variables: currency and checks/total deposit ratios and in net foreign assets should be taken as a positive sign of recovery in private sector confidence.

Returning to Table 5, it is easily appreciated that the three mentioned variables during the four quarters of 1989 had a depressing effect on the changes of both the multiplier and the monetary base, reflecting the low confidence of the public in the domestic currency. But in 1990 they changed dramatically to be the leading factors in positive variations of M1. Hence, the rapid growth of these variables during 1990 and in 1991 can be taken as a demonstration of recuperated confidence of the private sector in the economic program. To this confidence recovery and the reduced demand for Government financing can be attributed the

The data for 1991 are not included in Table 5, but the trend in the currency and checks/total deposit ratios and in net foreign assets has continued until the third quarter of 1991. The international reserves in Mexico has climbed to unprecedented levels \$16.7 billion US dollars.

dampening in inflationary pressures in the economy, despite the rapid increase in M1.

b.2.2 Policy measures

Two main policy measures have been undertaken by the Mexican Government to prevent some undesirable effects on the economy from the huge amount of money provided by the privatization program during the last three years.

The first one has been to deposit in a contingency account in the Bank of Mexico all the money from the proceeds of the sale. From this measure some meaningful effects have been derived:

- 1) Buyers were allowed to hand out to the Bank of Mexico all the Government bonds they had, and obtained in return the pesos demanded to make the payment to the Treasury of the enterprise bought. The Treasury, in turn, took the pesos and deposited them in the contingency account. Thus, reducing the money supply and also the amount of Government bonds in circulation, inducing a decline in their interest rate.
- 2) Buyers were also allowed to pay part of the value of the firm in US dollars. Thus, encouraging the return of capital flight, avoiding at the same time its monetary impact.

The second measure implemented by the Mexican Administration was to purchase public bonds in the hand of the Bank of Mexico for a value of 20 billion Mexican pesos, with money from the contingency account. This resolution had two main objectives:

One was to reduce the money base, restraining the inflationary pressures caused by the inflows of capital and the rapid increase in net foreign assets, which, as can be seen in Table 5 is the main factor affecting the growth of said aggregate. The other was to diminish the huge domestic public debt, and hence, its service, in such a way to match the reduced string of revenues the public sector will have after the privatization with a lower flow of financial commitment.

This latter measure was closely related to a more structural monetary resolution taken by the Bank of Mexico, at the outset of the disengagement of the most important commercial bank, Banamex. At the end of August there was an excess demand for Government bonds (CETES) because commercial banks were being pressured by the Bank of Mexico to comply with their liquid asset ratio, given that there was the feeling at that time that banks were doing excessive lending. Besides, because of its reduced need of financing the Government was issuing a reduced amount of bonds and the buyers of Banamex were pressuring the market too, since they had to gather in a short period of time a huge amount of Government bonds to make the first payment.

The result of the excess demand for CETES in the financial market, was a higher interest in the secondary market for bonds, while it was declining in the primary one. Of course, there was a lot of speculation among the financial investors during few days at the end of August.

The response to this short term crisis was a decision by the Bank of Mexico to eliminate the requirement of a 30 per cent liquid asset ratio to the new financial savings deposited at commercial banks, and reduce this coefficient to 25 per cent of the balance in banks at the end of August, converting them to 10-year public bonds.

The real motives behind this resolution was a dilemma faced by the monetary authority to promote long term financial savings. The liquid asset ratio requirement has created a captive demand for short term Government bonds, since it forced the banks to demand that type of bonds, and hence, the Government had to issue them. On the other hand, in order to stabilize the economy a change in the term structure of the domestic Government debt was required, since a large volume of public liabilities were in short term. Thus, an enlargement of the terms was necessary for having a longer term planning horizon.

This structural measure solved the short term crisis and contributed to change the maturity of the public debt. The problem it raised is that now, when the financial system has been liberalized and the commercial banks are being privatized, the monetary authority is left without any instrument, besides an attractive interest rate, to control the money supply through open market operations, since there is no reserve requirement or liquid asset ratio to force the financial institutions to buy Government bonds.

On the other hand, with banks that have no obligation to satisfy a preventive reserve even to avoid problems of liquidity, there is not guarantee that they will be conservative—enough to establish one by themselves to avoid problems when there are deposit withdrawals larger than normal.

III - FINAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

In the Introduction of this paper four main reasons were mentioned that support the recommendation to include the privatization of public enterprises within the measures to adopt in a structural adjustment program.

In the analysis of the Mexican privatization experience it has been found that these explanations are in general valid, since the program had contributed to stabilize the economy, helped to strenghten public finance, restored private sector confidence through a reduction in macroeconomic uncertainty, and encouraged domestic real investment through the offer to national entrepreneurs of a new range of business possibilities to develop.

Nevertheless, some considerations should be made: For example, in relation to the first argument used about the inefficiency of public firms. In this case the public sector cannot be blamed for the inefficiency of all the enterprises, since as it was mentioned in the paper most of the firms sold during the first part of the program were owned by the government, because it took them over from the private sector given the financial problems they were confronting.

Regarding the fourth explanation, in Mexico the divestment process has not improved income distribution, on the contrary it has worsened it, since most firms have been sold to conglomerates, increasing their social influence. Furthermore,

until now the proceeds of the sale have been used more for stabilization purposes than for income redistribution.

On the other hand, among the lessons that can be learned from the Mexican program, one is that the most publicized, homogenous and clear are the rules and practices followed in the divestment process, as well as in their results, minimal are the possibilities of wrong doing and highest the probabilities of a well managed program, resulting in higher income for the Government from the proceeds of privatization.

In the latter result, for obtaining the highest possible price from the sale of the enterprise a bidding system ALS very important, where several investors can compete freely for the acquisition of the firm.

Another point from the program analyzed is that even though some savings can arise with the divestment, from the reduction in subsidies previously going to inefficient enterprises, it is also true that most of the firms that are privatized were producing revenues to the Government. Thus, the public sector will face a reduced string of income following the privatization, so it will be wise to make up some reserves for this eventuality.

Finally, in the last two years the successful disengagement of the largest public enterprises in Mexico shows that it will be prudent to undertake preventive measures to avoid undesirable side effects on the macroeconomic environment, when large sum of money are expected from the sale of firms.

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MEXICO: PUBLIC ENTERPRISES SOLD

-- - - - 1763-179) ----NAME OF EXTERPRISE DATE tures MILLIGH & ***** -----1113 ACEADS DE SONDAA.S.A. DE C.V. 21-Dec-83 CORFGRACION INJUSTRIAL T COMERCIAL, S.R. 4,750.60 INTERRUPTURES DE METICO, S.A. 30-Mar-3) STEMMENS 06-Jun-63 REMARES DE FRANCIS 147.40 EDULPOS AUTOMOTRICES, S.A. se C.y. 4,499.50 VENIEULOS AUTOMOTORES PETTERNOS, S.A. 08-Jun-83 RENAULT DE FRANCIA RENAULT DE METICO, S.A. OF C.V. 08-Jun-83 SENAULT DE FRANCIA -----No. OF ENTERPRICES SOLD: 5 11.594.90 1 9 8 4 BICICLETAS CONDOR, S.A. 31-Jul-64 C.1.8. 206.10 TALLERES TLAJOMULCO, S.A. 31-141-64 C.1.R. ACCESORIOS TUBULARES ESFECTALES, S.A. 31-Jul-84 C.I.A. MO. OF ENTERPRISES SOLD: 3 206.10 1115 COMPARÍA METICAMA DE RADIOLOGIA CER. S.A. DE C.Y. 13-Mar-85 THOMPSON CSR OFERADORA DE MOTELES, S.A. LOFERACION MOTEL DEL PRADOI OPERADORA PRESIDENTE LAS PALRAS, S.A. DE C.V. 39.40 01-0ct-65 SEUPO TUENE, S.A. 25, 331.00 01-Oct-85 STUPP TURNAL, S.S.

MOTELES EL FRESIDENTE, S.A. & C.V. TANGBILIARTA EL PRESIDENTE SAN JOSE, S.A. 41-4ct-45 ### 18 M. S.A. 01-0ct-85 GRUPO TURNAL, S.A. MOTEL BALERIAS, S.A. GO C.V. IEL PRESIDENTE INTERNAL.I 01-001-05 GRUPO TUENAL, S.A. CORPORACION MACIONAL OFERADORA, S.A. Se C.V. 01-0c1-65 GRUPG TURNOL, S.A. MACIONAL MOTELERA DEL MORTE, S.A. 44 C.V. 01-0ct-05 SRUPO TURNAL, S.A. IMMOBILIARIA EL PRESIDENTE LOGETO, S.A. 01-Oct-85 GRUPO TURNEL, S.A. SERVICIOS INTERNALES. DE VENICULOS ACUATICOS, B.A. de C.V. INNOSIL. HOTELERA EL PRESTDENTE CHAPIL., B.A. de C.V. HACIONAL HOTELERA, S.A: 01-Gc1-85 SEUFO TUENAL, S.A. GEOFO TURNAL, S.A. 01-0ct-65 01-0c1-65 GRUPO TUENAL, S.A. EL PRESIDENTE MOTELES INC. IDENA, DE VENT, Y RESERV. EUAI 01-0c1-05 GRUPO SURNAL, S.A. DPERADORA EL PRESIDENTE TONA ROSA, S.A. 01-0ct-85 SEUFO TUERAL, S.A. HOTELES Y CENTROS ESPECIALIZAGOS, S.A. 61-Oct-85 SEUPO TURNEL, S.A. HAVER. TURIST. DEL CARIBE, S.A. GO C.V. (EL PRESIDENTE COZUMEL)

IRPUL. DE ERPRESAS INVISTICAS, S.A. (EL PRESID. CARCUM)

RESTAURANTES EL PRESIDENTE, S.A. GO C.V.

INNOSILIARIA LA CANTERA, S.A. 01-Oct-65 GRUPO TURNAL, S.A. SRUPO TUENAL, S.A. SEUPO TUENAL, S.A. 01-0ct-85 01-0ct-85 27-5es-85 ENGOTELLADORA METROPOLITANA, S.A. Se C.V. 1,944.00 EMBOTELLAGORA BARET ERESPO. S.A. 27-Seg-85 ENBOTELLADORA METROPOLITANA LPEPST COLAT GRANJA BUENAGUA, S. DE K.L. 27-Sep-85 ERBOTELLADORA RETROFOLITAMA (PEPS) CILAT 27-Sep-85 ERBOTELLADORA RETROFOLITAMA (PEPS) COLAT REFRESCOS Y ALIMENTOS GARCI CRESPO, S.A. DE C.V.

- MARANTIALES BAN LORENIO, S.A. DE C.V.	27-5ep-85	ENECTELLADORA RETROPOLITANA EPEPET CULAT	.•	
TRANSPORTED GARCI-CAESPO, S.A.	17-500-65	ENEGTELLAGORA RETROPOLITANA TPEPSI COLAT		
- DISTRIBUIDORA SAN LORENZO, S.A.	27-5ep-85	EMBOTELLAGORA METROPOLITANA (FEFS) COLA)		
MANUFACTURERA METICANA DE PARTES DE AUTOMOVILES, S.A. DE C.V.	04-500-65	INDUSTRIAS MACGERE, S.A.	312.50	
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KSB REILCANA, S.A.	06-316-65	AUCIC GFERADORA, S.A. 4e C.V.	224.40	4
BOLGAS Y GATICULOS DE PAPEL, S.A.		COPANEL, S.A. de C.V.	116.80	
BOLSAS DE FAFEL BUADALAJARA, S.A. de C.V.		COPANEL, S.A. de C.V.	131.30	
CLA. minera comonfort		ACOLFO SAANA	21.00	

No. OF ENTERPRISES SOLD: 33		•	29,249.30	
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SISTEMAS DE EMERSIA AUTOMORA, S.A. DE C.V.		SR. ENATGUE MERICANSAT). Iv	
RANUFACTURERAS ELECTRONICAS, S.A.		GRUPO MONTECASING Y PARTICULARES	1,050.10	
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NUEVA SAN 1310RO, S.A. DE C.Y. Albugi melicana. S.A. de C.Y.		GRUPO AACO LOCERIA JALISCIENSE, ING. EUSEBIO RUBIO BALGUENA	500.00	
		GENERO INDUSTRIAL BOCAR, S.A. DE C.V. 1 SPO. IND. SALDUAR, S.A. DE C.V.	445.00	
CIA. INDUSTRIAL Y COMERCIAL AMERICANA, S.A. de C.Y.		SR. SALVADOR MILAMES A.	304.€0	
POLLÉTILENO MONTERAÉT, S.A.		SR. PABLO REJSA	125.00	
POLITECHICA DE MONTEÁREY, S.A.		SR. FABLO NETIA		
CONFECCIONES DE OCCIDENTE		C.T.A. (INC./15-000)	3,615.00	
MUEYA RAL. TEETIL MANUF. DEL SALIG. S.A.	07-Jul-84			
MANUF. FAIRBANKS HORSE, S.A. DE C.V. E IND. FAIRBANKS HORSE DE CENTROAMERICA.S.A.	30-241-84	UNION DE TRABAJADORES DEL HIERRO, DERIVADOS, COMETOS METALUR, DEL EDOMEI,	375.00	
NAVICEMENT, S.A.	01-001-84	EAGLE CENENT CORPORATION	30,742.00	
CESEA. S.A.	01-0ct-84	EAGLE CEMENT CORPORATION	•	
CEMENTOS ANAKUAC DEL GOLFO, S.A. DE C.V.		EAGLE CEMENT CORPORATION	•	
MATERIAS PRIMAS ANAMUAC DEL BOLFO. S.A.		EASLE CEMENT CORPORATION	•	
AVANTRAN METICANA, S.A.		SR. JOSE RAMON FEENLES	140.00	
PROMOCIONES & COMISIONES AVANIRAM. S.A.		SK. JOSE RANOM PEKGLES	******	
MEICAL SANTIAGO, S.A.			A 14	
ENVASES GENERALES CONTINENTAL, S.A. DE C.V.		C. RAALA MATIVIDAD FLORES DE BARIDAY	6.35	
		CONTINENTAL CAN CO. INC.	1,450,00	••
PORCELANAS EURONEI, S.A. DE C.V.		JAP NEWCOR INC.	4,411.40	
GRUPA INDUSTRIAL DEL FUERTE	}4- 3 }£- 3 \$	SOCIOS AGRICULIONES	1,864.90	
-ALINENTOS DEL FUERTE, S.A. DE C.V.		•	•	
PRODUCTOS INDUSTRIALES DEL FUERTE, S.A. DE C.V. LOS MOCHIS		•	•	
-GRUPO INDUSTRIAL DEL FUERTE, S.A. DE C.V. DJO CALIENTE, IAC.		•	•	
INDUSTRIAS ALTRENTICIAS NACIONALES, S.A.			•	
-PLANTA INDUSTRIALITADORA DE VEGETALES Y HORTALIZAS		<u>:</u>	•	
-MALTIPACK			•	
GRUPO PRODOSONEY 8	27-Jun-84	SEUFO VITEO	3,722.00	
-ACEROS ESMALTADOS, S.A. DE C.V	:		•	
-ACROS, S.A.	:		•	
-ACROTEC, S.A. DE C.V.			:	
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-ESTUFAS Y REFRIGERADORES MACIONALES, S.A. M. C.V.	•		:	
-FORRADOS, A.P.B., S.A.				
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"ME ICON SASE EN LA EVALUACIÓN DE LAS ENFRESAS Y BEL GRUPO, ASÍ COMO DE LAS CONDICIONES DEL REPCADO DE CAPITALES SE DETERMINO UM RANGO DE EVALUACIÓN PARA EL SPUPO DUE FUE DE UN MÍNIMO DE 11.871 MILL. A UN NATIONO DE 17.268 MILL.; SIN EMBARGO SE EFECTUARON EROGACIONES ASÍ COMO COMPROMISOS QUE LE CORRESPONDIERON ABSORDER NA BODIERNO FEDERAL, POR 10 BUE ESTE SOLO NECIDIO LA CANTIDAD AQUI MENCIONADA.

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GLICGLES METICANOS, S.A. DE C.V.	04-Fab-87	GRUPO IDESA	2,500.00
CONCRETOS PROCESADOS, S.A.	09-461-87	GRUFG ANAHUAC T PARTICULASES	2,540,00
CONCRETOS TAMAULIPAS, S.A.	99-Abr-87	SRUFO GHANGE & PARTICULARES	•
RESINERIA EJIDAL DE MICHOACAN, S.A.	24-847-97	SAUPO DE EJIDOS E COMUNIDADES INDISENAS ASOCIADOS.	100.00
CEKÉS ÉCULGAICA GE MELICO, S, A. DE C, Y.	31-May-87	SH. CARLUS ALEJANGRU MUKNEDO NARIN	\$0.00
AECIUNES BURSATILES SOMEL, S.A.	03-Jua-87	COLOCACION BUNSATIL	32,560,70
CLUB DEFORTIND ATLANTE	29-Jun-87	EKUPO GARCIS, S.A.	140.00
FIBRAS MACIONALES DE ACRILICO, S.A.	03-141-67	GRUFO KALTES	\$7,445,60
ENVASES I ENPAQUES NACIONALES, S.A.	13-Jul-81	GRUPO INGUSTRIAL BURANGO (INC. /03-00))	54,000,00
COMPANIA INDUSTRIAL DE ATENGUIQUE, S.A.	13-Jul-07	GRUPO INDUSTRIAL DURANGO	•
INDUSTRIAS FORESTALES INTEGRALES, S.A.	13-201-87	GRUPO INDUSTRIAL BURANGO	•
SERVICIGS ATENSA, S.A.	13-Jul-87	GRUPO INDUSTRIAL DURANGO (INC./05-001)	•
UNIGA FORESTAL DE JALISCO Y COLINA, S.A.	13-Jul-87	GRUPO INDUSTRIAL BURANGO	•
BINA CURRINGS	25-Sep-87	CUMANINGS ENGLINE CO.	\$7,120.00
INDELTA, S.A. DE C.V.	01-0ct-07	INDUSTRIAS RACTURE, S.A. DE C.V.	8,760.00
RECANICA FALK Y GERIYADGS.S.A. DE C.V.	[4-0ct-87	SUNDSTRAND PACIFIC LTD. FALK CORP. Y JACK E.	2, 110. 30
CASELAS DE ACERO KIKAPOQ	14-0c1-87	TRINITY INDUSTRIES INC Y GRUPO TAISA	1,594.40
FOLIESTIFEAD T DERLYADDS, S.A. DE C.V.	16-Mov-87	SRUPO IDESA, S.A. DE C.V.	24,752.00
PRODUCTORA NACIONAL DE REDES, S.A. DE C.V.	10-0ic-07	MONOL FISHING MET. CO.	3,407.50
PRODUCTOS DUINICOS E INDUSTRIALES DEL BAJIO, S.A.	22-Dec-87	SR. MANUEL ESTRADA CAMPUSANG Y SOCIOS	214.14

NO. OF ENTERPRISES SOLD: 20

229,158.30

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-	TAVALOS INDUSTRIAL, S.A.	07-Ene-88	GRUPO INDUSTRIAL BEL BASIS BIG MATG. S.A. BE C.V.	1,598.30
	MAJERAS INDUSTRIALIZADAS DE MAYARII	08-£ae-88	SOBIERNO DEL ESTADO DE NAVARIT	1.00
•	_AGmESIYG5, S.A.	20-14n-88	MERESIS, S.A. DE C.Y.	3,000.00
	AUTOEIPRESS REGIOMONTANO, S.A.		SR. BERNARGO LIJISTAIN Y SOCIOS	700.00
-	CLORG DE TEHURNTEPEC, S.A. DE C.V.	03-feh-84		44,161,10
	PERFILES 1 ESTRUCTURAS DE DURANGO, S.A.	15-feb-08	GRUPO ARMAS, S.A. DE C.V.	233.70
Ŷ	POLIMAE, S.A. DE C.V.	17-feb-28	GRUPO ICA Y OTROS	1,401.90
	TOFRES MELICAMAS, S.A.	14-Kar-82	SINDICATO UNICO DE TRABAJADORES ELECTRICISTAS DE LA REP. NET. Y EPH S.A.	5,000.00
	HULES METICANOS, S.A.	27-Mar - 88	GRUPO SERVIA Y SINDICATO DE LA INDUSTRIA PETROQUINICA	57,319.00
	REFEACIORIDS RELICANOS, S. A.	25-Nay- 38	INDUSTRIAS PERCLES, S.A. DE C.V. IQUINICA MAGNA S.A.)	2,100.00
	GRUPO CACENA	08-Apr-88	CIN	7,000.00
	-COMPARIA TEITIL METICAMA, S.A.	QQ-Apr-48	•	•

	-HILADOS GRANIA, S.A. DE C.V.	Do-Apr-di	•	•
	-COMPANIA TETTIL JACARANDA, S.A.	8å•Aor•á8	•	•
	-GRUPD TEITH LADENA. S.A. DE C.V.	88-101-88	•	•
•	-HILAGE CADENA, S.A. DE C.V.	88-Apr-88	•	•
	-MILADOS GUAGALAJARA, S.A. DE C.V.	08-Apr-64	•	•
	♥GRJAMEt,S.A. DE C.Y.	74-4br-86	SPICER, S.A.	4,400,00
	VITRUM DIVISION FARMACEUTICA.S.A. DE C.V.	29-Apr-86	GRUPO INDUSTRIAL BEXAVIDES	1,148.00
•	MARAGLES DE VALLE DEL MELDUTTAL, S. A.		INDUSTRIAS MUREL	480.00
	BARRENAS DE ACERO Y ABUCES, S.A.		LIC. MARIO DE AGUERO AGUIRRE	144.00
	BENEFICIADORA DE FRUTAS CITRICAS Y TROPICALES DE COLIMA, S.A. DE C.V.		BOBIERNO SEL ESTADO/CHC/PRODUCTORES	1,784.00
	INGENIO DE ATENCINACISA. DE C.V.		CORPORACION INDUSTRIAL ESCORFION	47,500.00
	INGENIO FIJILTIC, S.A.		GFERADORA DEL GRIJALVA, S.A. DE C.V.	42,000.00
	DINA ROCKWELL		ING. RODOLFO BARRERA VILLAGREAL	30,500.10
	INGENIO ROSALES.S.A.		FRANGUICIAS ESFECIALES, S.A. BE C.V.	11,024.00
	CIR. REGICANA DE 1UVOS. S.A.		PERFILES ESTRUCTURALES DEL MORTE	1,135.00
	INGENIO DE PUGA		CONSOLCIO AGA	40,000.00
	BARITA DE SONDRA, S.A.		CORPORACION EULALIO GUITERRELIFISON.	22,032.00
	RETALUABICA ALMERA. S.A.		SOCIOS MATORITARIOS	200.00
	IMPUESTA Y ELPORTADORA MACIUMAL, S.A. DE C.V.		MITSUL/CONESEC/CADENA/MUMATER/DINOS	492.10
	ATISA ATKIAS, S.A. DE C.V.		ENFLERDOS DE LA ENGRESA	70.00
	MERICO INVERSIONES, S.A.		COMERC. DE PROD. Y BIENES, S.A. DE C.V.	10,525.00
	TORNILLOS AASSINI, S.A. DE C.V.		CCRPGEACTON INDUSTRIAL SAN LUIS/C. I.A.	57,500.00
	GAJPO KASSINI, S.A. DE C.V.		COMPONICION INDUSTRIAL SAN LUIS/C.1.M.	3,,300,00
	ACEROS RASSINI, S.A. DE C.V.		CORPORACION INDUSTRIAL SAN LUIS/C.T.N.	
			CONFORMACION INDUSTRIAL SAM LUTS/C. f.m.	
	ENVASES KASSINI, S.A. DE C.V.		CORPORACION INSUSTRIAL SAM ENTS/C.T.R.	•
	RASSINI, S.A. DE C.V.			•
	RECIFIENTES RETICANOS, S.A.		CORPORACION INDUSTRIAL SAN ENTS/C.T.N.	12,000.00
	AEILCANA DE AUTOBUSES, S.A.		SAMEL DIGISSER	
	\$35A 181COCO, 5.A.		PROYECTO "S" DE METICO	20,000.00
	ACEROS TOURNE, S.A.		SOCIOS AATORITAKIOS	100.00
	CARROS DE FERROCAFRIL DE DURANGO, S.A.		SUPPLIANT S.A.	250.00
	BENEF. DE FRUTAS CITRICAS Y TROPICA,/GATAGA		BENELIN DAIACA, S.A.	\$00.00
	CHAPAS Y TRIPLAY, S.A.		CHAPAS Y TABLEROS MONDEL, S.A. BE C.V.	725.00
	RANUF. DE CIGUERALES DE METICO, S.A. DE C.V.		SK, JOSE RIGUEL MADER	16,900,00
	CIA. AZUCARERA LA CONCEPCION, S.A.		SRES, FOS TORRES /EMACTELLADORA METROP,/AGRO THD. DEL SUR	8,000.00
	INGENIO DE MAMUITILAM, S. DE A.L. DE C.V.		UNION DE PECO, DE AZUCAR,/DERIY., FOMENTO AZUCAKERO	28,500.00
	INGENIO EL HIGO, S.A.		UMION DE PROD. DE ALUCAR./DERIV., FOMENTO ALUCARERO LINC./15-1241	•
	HOTEL CHULAVISTA RONCLOVA, S.A.		CONTROL INDUSTRIAL MONCLOVA	325.00
	FUNDICIONES DE HIERRO Y ACERO, S.A.	25-May-80	ING. JUAN LATAPI, ING. JUAN MARNAN GRYJ T SOCIOS	3,024.00
	IMMCBILIARIA HOTELERA	25-Nov-\$1	SACI MAFIN SORSE	1,321.00
	TUBÉRIA NACIONAL, S.A.	29-401-88	GRUPO VILLACEIO	11,250.00
	INGENIO SAN AIGUELITO, S.A.	29-Mot-68	GPO. SABRE/FEOD. ME ATUCAR, S.A. DE C.V. (INC./15-165)	230,000.00
	Inocala El modela, S.A.	29-3098	SPO. SABRE/PESAKKOLLO DE LA SUASTECA VER., S.A. DE C.V.	•
•	INGENIO EL POTRERO, S.A.	29-Hov-88	6PO. SABRE/NOLIENDA AZUCARERA, B.A. DE C.V.	•
	TEREFIALATOS METICANOS, S.A.	29-May-88	PETROCEL, S.A.	242,712.30
	₽RGDUCTOS PESQUERGS DE LA PAI, S.A. BE C.V.	21-Nov-68	ENPRESAS ATUMERAS TUCKER	7,100.00
	GRAFITO DE METICO, S.A.	29-May-84	SCU. BEL EDO. DE DAI./SE, BATOMID VALDEZ	6,100.00
-	PROCUCTOS PESQUEROS DE MATATLAN, S.A. DE C.V.		GEUPO CONER. NETICANA/SEUPO BAIR	11,500.00
	FERROMINERA METICANA, S.A.	10-101-66		1.00
	INSENIO LA SLOKIA, S.A.	30-May-86	PROMOTORA INDUSTRIAL AZUCARERA, S.A. DE C.V. (INC./15-163)	171,799.50
	INSERIO ADOLFO LOPEZ MATEOS	30-ho10	PROMOTORA INDUSTRIAL AZUCARERA, S.A. DE C.V.	
	INGENIO TRES VALLES, S.A.	30-80+-88	PROMUTORA INDUSTRIAL AZUCARERA, S.A. DE C.V. (INC./15-163)	•
	ARRENDADOKA BAMPESCA, S.A. DE C.V.		HOLDING FIASA, S.A. SE C.V.	3,325.00
	FLETES MAR, S.A.	30-May-84	INDUSTRIAS CALICO, S.A. DE C.V. Y SOCIOS	4,500.00

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	NEF, DE FRUTAS CITRICAS Y TROPICALES DE BUERRERO	12-Jan-01	LIGA COAUM./CHC/GOB. EDO, DE GUERPERO	1,625.00
	GENIO CALIFAM, S.A. DE C.V.		CONSORCIO ENQUETATAL ESCOSPION, S.A. DE C.V.	\$5,900.00
	SENIO FLAN DE SAN LUIS, S.A. DE C.V.		CONSORCIG INDUSTRIAL ESCORPION, S.A. DE C.V.	•
	MERCIAL DE TELAS, S.A.		OBEROS SINDICALITADOS DE LA ENPRESA	2,250.00
	GENIO QUESERIA, S.A.		GAUPO BETA SAN MISUEL, S.A. DE C.V.	264,000.00
	GENIO PONCIANO ARRIAGA, S.A.	13-140-61	GRUPO BETA SAN RIGUEL, S.A. DE C.V.	•
	SENIO ALVARO OBRESON, S.A.		GRUPO BETA SAK RIGUEL, S.A. DE C.V.	•
	inen.aluca.del centro, 5.a. lingeni o fco.amecai	13-Jan-89	GRUPO BETA SAN RIGUEL, S.A. PE C.V.	
	ITEL EL MIRAGOR, S.A.	08-Feb-87	DESARROLLOS TURISTICOS DEL FACIFICO, S.A. DE C.V.	2,560,60
	MERA LAMPAIOS, S.A. DE C.V.	ùf-feb-69	ENPRESA FRISCO, S.A. DE C.V.	102,000.00
นิบ	IIMICA FLUOA, S.A. DE C.V.	09-Feb- 69	ENFRESA FRISCO, S.A. DE C.Y.	•
ĦĮ.	NERA REAL DE ANGELES, S.A. DE C.V.	69-540-69	ENFRESA FRISCO, S.A. DE C.Y.	•
	CCCOTAC, S.A.	09-R44-89	CONFAGIA MINERA CAGFAS, S.A. DE C.Y.	12,560.00
MB	IGAES PEAKINS, S.A.	17-#4r-89	ENPLEADOS ORGANITAGOS DE LA ENPRESA	12,110.00
AL	GODONERA COMERCIAL MEXICANA, S.A.	26-Rar-89	Saupo Orail	4,628.80
₽E	FRACTARIGS HIDALGO	24-Apr-89	INDUSTRIAS FEMOLES, S.A. BE C.V.	3,475.00
Jĸ	MGBILIAKIA METICANA INDUSTRIAL, S.A.		GRUFU INSUSTRIAL LUI, S.A. DE C.V.	2,320.00
ÇE	NTRO INDUSTRIAL BIGGUINICO, S.A. DE C.V.		SE. JAINE BENAVIDES FORPA	13,235.40
	RUNAVES DE MELICO, S.A. DE C.V.		ICARO AERUTRAXSPORTES, S.A. DE C.V.	455,190.00
K1	ERRO Y ACERO DEL MORTE, S.A.		FAMILIA MONTEMATOR	3,120.00
	A. JADUSTATAL AZUCAREKA, S.A. IJNGENJO CHATOIOLAPAN)		GRUFO DE INVERSIONISTAS DE AMERIMEI	104,220.80
	GENLO PLAN DE NYALA, S.A.		SAUPO DE INVERSIONISTAS DE AMERIMEI	144,714,84
	GENIO SAN GABRIEL YERACKUI, S.A.		GRUPO DE INVERSIONISTAS DE AMERAMET	
	MFAMIA MINERA CEDROS, S.A.		INDUSTRIAS PEROLES, S.A. DE C.V.	4,200,00
	MARALA MESICANA DE ARIACION, S.A. DE C.V.		SRUPO TABRE	
	ROPUERIOS Y TERRENOS, S.A.		GRUFO TABRE	358,820.00
	TATRONIC, S.A. (SOZ)	•	ERUFO TREAT	
	TILLERUS UNIDOS DE ENSENADA, S.A. DE C.V.		CIA. SIDESURGICA DE GUADALAJARA, S.A. DE C.V.	
	ASA INGENIERIA		INSTACTOR DE ACCIONISTAS EN INGENIESTA, S.B. SE C.V.	10,500.00
	TO DIESEL METICANA, S.A. DE C.V.		ERUPO RUYESA, S.A. DE C.Y.	5,266.00
	FES Y CAFETERIAS DE MELICO, S.A. DE C.V.		VALLES GALICIA, S.A. BE C.V.	22,000.00
	TRUCTURAS DE ACERO, S.A.			460.00
	MA AUTOBUSES, S.A. DE C.Y.		SOCIEDAD INDUSTRIAL HERAES, S.A. DE C.V.	1,000.00
	NA CAMIONES, S.A. DE.C.V.		ERUFO '6', S.A. SE C.V.	142,198.90
			GRUPO 161, S.A. BE C.V.	:
	RA MOTORES S.A. DE C.V. ASTICOS AUTOMOTRICES DINA		SRUPO '6', S.A. DE C.V.	:
	TANIATORA RESICANA, S.A.		ERUPO '6', S.A. BE C.Y.	
	ECTROMETALURGIA DE VERACRUI, S.A. DE C.V.		SRUPO DE INVERSIONISTAS REPRESENT, POR GONJALB FREI, VILLAMMEVA	13,442.00
	FRINGE INCOMEN AT ACCUSTANT STATE BY BY PERSON	27-MOY-65	PROVEEDORA DE ALEACIONES, S.A.	22,200.00
i				

No. OF ENTERFRISES SOLD: 38

1,798,621.90

` k			
COMPARIA KEAL DEL MONTE Y PAEMUCA, S.A.	23-feb-90	endustrias peroles, s.a.	14,440.00
COMPAGIA KEAL DEL MONTE Y PACHUCA, S.A. # PRODUCTUS PESQUEROS DE GUAYMAS, S.A. DE C.V.	13-Mar-90	LIC. SALVAGOR LIZAKRAGA SAUCEDO	22,200.00
lmbustrias CGAASUPD. 5.A.			
- PLANTA TULTITIAN - PLANTA ISUALA, SAO. IVENTA DE ACTIVOSI - PLANTA NUEVO LAREDO TAAPS. (VENTA DE ACTIVOSI	23-Feb-90	UNILEVER, S.A. COMACIALITADORA FORTINET, S.A. DE C.V. HIDROGENADARA NACIONAL, S.A. DE C.V. JANOMES T DETERREMIES, S.A. DE C.V. PROTEINAS INDUSTRIMES LA LAGUMA, S.A. DE C.V. RADQIADUSTRIME INTERNADAS DEL MORTE, S.A. DE C.V.	200,000.00
- PLANIA 16UALA, 6AO. IYENTA DE ACTIYOD)	03-Apr-90	COMERCIALIZADORA FORTIMEZ, S.A. DE C.V.	2,017.00
- PLANTA MUEVO LAREDO TAMPS. (VENTA DE ACTIVOS)	16-Apr-90	HIDROGERADORA RACIORAL, S.A. DE C.V.	20,829.00
- PLANIA MONIEKKEY, N.L. 2 LYENIA DE ACILVOSI	14-Apr-10	JABORES 1 DETERBENTES, S.A. DE C.V.	15,430.00
- PLANTA SOMEL FALACIO, DEO, (VENTA DE ACTIVOS)	23-Apr-90	PROTETNAS INDUSTATALES LA LAGUNA, S.A. DE C.V.	44,089.00
- PLANTA MONIENÄET, M.L. L (VENIG DE ACTIVOS)	26-Apr-90	ABROINDUSTRIAS INTEGRADAS DEL MORTE, S.A. DE C.V.	54,400.00
- FLANTA CIUDAD OBRESON, SON. 2 LVENTA DE ACTIVOSI	70-1116-90	RODERCAA, S.A. DE C.V.	77.103.30
- PLANTA NAVOJDA, SON. LVENTA DE ACTIVOS)	07-1-1-60	TRASPONIBLISO, S.A. DE C.V. INDUENES RAGAR, S.A. DE C.V. HISDOSENDORA MACIDUAL, S.A. DE C.V. AHORRINOI, S.A. DE C.V. CHAPAS T IRIPLAT DE QUINTANA ROO, S.A. CHAPAS T CRIPLAT DE GUINTANA ROO, S.A. ASOCIACION DE CONSULTORIA TECNOLÓGICA, S.C. SIAO, IRAB. DE PROO, PESQUEROS BANTA DE IDRIUGAS, S.A. COURD DISTORIO S.A.	14,593.40
- PLANTA MATAMOROS, TAMPS. (VENTA DE ACTIVOS)	04-1-1-10	INTUERLES RAGAR, S.A. DE C.V.	33,249.00
- PLANTA MELICALI, B.C.N. LVENTA DE ACTIVOSI	08-Aug-90	HIDROGENADORA MACIONAL, S.A. DE C.V.	28,478,50
AETINGS, S.A. DE C.V.	23-Aar-90	AMOSRIMOI, S.A. DE C.V.	128, 528, 80
SERVICIOS FORESTALES, S.A.	17-Apr-90	CHAFAS T ERIPLAY DE QUINTAMA ROO, S.A.	4,450.00
MADERAS INDUSTRIALIZADAS DE QUINTANA ROO, S.A.	17-Agr-90	CHAPAS T CRIPLAT DE QUINTANA ROO. S.A.	•
SCHOCAL, S.A.	23-Agr-90	ASOCIACION DE CONSULTORIA TECNOLOGICA. S.C.	2,500.00
PRODUCTOS PESQUEROS DE BAHTA DE TORTUGAS, S.A. DE C.V.	24-Abr-90	SIND, IRAB, DE PROD. PESGUEROS BANTA DE IDPIUGAS. S.A.	17,500.00
DEMEFICIADGIA DE COCO DE ACAPULCO, S.A. DE C.V.	25-Apr-10	GRUPO CIERYO, S.A.	3,030.00
TATPLAT GE PALENGUE, S.A.		CORP. PARAMERICANA EMPRESARIAL, S.A. DE C.V.	2,534,20
FERMENTACIONES METICANAS, S.A. DE C.V.		KIDAA HAKKO 60670 CD. LIB. Y SUMITOMO COMPORATION	47,450.30
SUR DEL FACIFICO, S.A.		PROMOCIONES TURISTICAS SAMAMES, S.A. DE C.Y.	1,035.60
TABAMEX (PLANTA DESY, LAZARO CARDENAS VENTA DE ACTIVOS)		CIGARRERA LA TABACALERA MELICAMA, S.A. M. C.V.	14,500.00
PRODEL IVENTA DE ACTIVOSI		OPERADORA RETROPOLITANA DE LACTEOS, S.A. DE C.Y.	64,779.30
CLA. DE MANUFACTURAS METALICAS PESADAS, S.A. DE C.Y.		INDUSTRIAS ICA, S.A. DE C.V.	24,411,40
CINES REGIONALES, S.A.		MARIA INES CHAVEL ALVAREL BID JAINE LOPEL ROMERO	243.00
EXPORTACION DE TABACOS MEXICANOS, 8.A.		ELPORTADORA DE ARTICULOS MELICANOS, S.A. DE C.V.	13,160.00
SERVICIOS DE TELERESERVACIONES		SERIEL, S.A. M. C.V.	49, 350, 40
BATATRONIC (501)			1,150.00
TURBORRENCTURES, S.A. DE C.V.	10-4	COSSOSACTOM DESTEAMS AC AUTACIÓN	54,217.00
PROGUCTOS PESQUENOS DE SALINA CRUZ, S.A. DE C.V.	20-Acc-80	SIND, TRAS, IND. PESO, FEB.RES, SOC. COOP. IND. PES. DAL.	4,754.00
Tubaceko, S.A.	20-Aug-10	ACERDS GENERALES, S.A. DE C.V./JAINE WOLDENDERS R.	
LKBAAIIGUDAA DE MEKMOSILLO. S.A.		C. BEATRIE HERDIVIL 6. 1 4 SOCIOS	\$2,488.00
FIDEFCUAISO DE LA FALAR, S. DE R.L. DE 1.P. Y C.V.			450.00
		PRODIPALRA 18 UNIONES DE COMUR./UNA SOC. DE SOLIB.S.)	16.00
FABRICAS DE TRACTORES ABRICOLAS, S.A. ALIMENTOS BALANCEADOS DE NEITOO, S.A. DE C.V.	21-MG0-10	ING. RODOLFO BARRERA VIELAGREM	24,000.00
- PLANTA MERIDA, TUC. (VENTA DE ACTIVOS)	13-300-90	(m) (m) A CA	.1 104 -4
			13,500.00
- FLAMIN ICCLUDED, ACT COCAIN OF HEISYDD		RESICANA DE SEVERSSONES FERAC, S.A. DE C.V.	14,500,00
- Flamia Teicoco, mei iventa de activosi - Flamia Guadalajara, jal. Iventa de activosi - Flamia ingustrial meilonima iventa de activosi		CC. SERGIO MUROI AMARA Y JOSE LUIS ALVAREZ ZIMENEZ	1,125,00
COMPANIA MINERA DE CANANEA, S.A.		ECOLOGIA 1 RECURSOS ASOCIAGOS, S.A. DE C.V.	5,000.60
# TABACOS ALTECAS. 3.A.		RELICANA DE CAMPAEA, S.A. DE C.V.	1,244,435.00
INGENIO LA FURISINA		CISARRERA LA MODERNA, S.A. DE C.V.	18,647.00
INPULSORA DE LA CUENCA DEL PAPALDAPAN, S.A. DE C.V.		OPERABORA AZUCASERA SEL FACIFICE, S.A. DE C.V.	3,700.60
INFOCTOR DE LA COERCA DEL PAPACHARA, S.A. DE C.V. INGENIO JOSE MARIA MARILNEI, S.A.		CONSORCIO INDUSTATAL ESCORPION, S.A. DE C.V. CONPORACION ENDUSTATAL SUCRUM. S.A. DE C.V.	50,000.00 154,819,90
		* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *	130,811,500
INGENIO LAIARO CARDENAS, S.A.		CORPORACIOM INDUSTRIAL SUCRUM, S.A. DE C.V. CORPORACIOM INDUSTRIAL SUCURN, S.A. DE C.V.	•
INGENIO INDEPENDENCIA, S.A. COMPARIA INDUSTRIAL AZUCAKERA SAN PEDRO, S.A.		FORDO DE INVERSIONES VERNERUZ, S.A. DE C.V.	35,235.00
		FORDO DE INVERSIONES VERACUII, S.A. DE C.V.	33,633.00
INSERIO SAN FRANCISCO EL NARANJAL, S.A. INSERIO EGRENIO ALIFADERO DEL LOICO E A		FCADO DE INVERSIONES VERACRUI, S.A. DE C.V.	
INSENIO FOMENIO ALUCARERO DEL BOLFO, S.A.	03-06(-10	TOWARD BY THIS TOWARD TENNERS IN THE STATE	

	Linder-40	6€0FO GUILLEN, S.A. DE C.V.	6,120,60
CON ITALIANA DE METICO, S.A. DE C.V.		SPO. PORKES BUEND + PERCOND BUEND	23,001,00
IO DE MUTITILA, S.A.			76,133.00
10 SE MULITIA, S.A. 10 SE CENTR DEAMPO, S.A. 10 SE SERSTIAN, S.A.	16-001-10	UNION DE PRODUCTORES DE CRRA, C.R.C. UNION DE PRODUCTORES DE CARA, C.M.C.	••
10 SA SEBASTIAN, S.A.		WITH DE ANDUCTORES BE CATA, C.E.C	
10 SANTA CLARA, S.A.		CONSORCIO REA DE GUALAJARA, S.A.	11,400.00
TIA BIUCARERA DE LOS MOCHIS, S.A.		GR. ANCIES DE LA GARIA Y SOCIOS	16,000.00
ID & JUCHITAN, S.A.		OR. ANDRES DE LA BANIA Y SOCIOS	•
REA AZUCARERA DEL ISTMO, S.A.		SE, JOAQUIN REDO	44,000.00
ID JOSE MARIA MORELOS, S.A.			
IO PRESIDENTE BENTTO JUAREZ, S.A.		SA. JOAGU (N. REDG	•
TERA DE LA CHONTALPA, S.A.		SR. JORGUIN RECO	
10 mERMEMEGILDO GALEAMA, S.A.		SA, JOAQUIA KESO	160.00
SCREADOR CHAIREL (VENTA DE ACTIVOS)		SERVICIOS MAUTICOS EL DORADO, S.A. DE C.V.	21.550.00
ITOS PESQUEROS DE SINALDA, S.A. DE C.Y.		METABRE, S.A. DE C.V./PESQUERA CALIFORNIA, S.A. DE C.V.	21,800.00
CTOS PESQUEROS DE MATANCITAS, S.A. DE C.Y.		MELABRE, S.A. DE C.V. PESGUERA CALIFGRATA, S.A. DE C.V.	
TIOS PESQUEROS DE TOPOLOSAMPO, S.A. DE C.Y.		REIABAE, S.A. DE C.V./PESQUERA CALIFORNIA, S.A. LE C.V.	
ERA DEL PACIFICO, S.A. DE C.V.		MEIRBRE, S.A. DE C.V./FESQUERA CALIFORNIA. S.A. DE C.V.	62,250.00
A SAN CARLOS (ACTIVO SEBREGADO DE P.P. PAZ)		SOC. COUPERATIVA DE PROD. PESQUERA BANTA MABOALINA	350.00
DOKA DEL EI-CONVENTO DE SANTA CATARIAMA, S.A. DE C.V.		HOTELES FRESIDENTE, S.A. DE C.+.	4,501.00
JAJS DE METICO, S.A. DE C.V. (4.42)		SINDICATO DE LA ENVESA	455, 107.50
JAUS DE MEIICO, S.A. DE C.V. 120.4%)		BRUPO CARSO, SOUTHWESTERN BELL, FRANCE CABLE & FADIO	5,171,216.00
LAGGRA DE CASAS, S.A. DE C.V.		GRUPO CARSO, SOUTHWESTERN BELL, FRANCE CABLE & RADIO	•
105 EN DIRECTORIOS, 3.A.		BRUFG CARSO, SJUTHMESTERN BELL, FRANCE CABLE & RACIO	•
IIACIONES METICAMAS, S.A. DE C.V.		BRUFO CHASO, SOUTHWESTERN BELL, FRANCE CARLE & AACID	•
ATA DE TELEFONGS Y BIENES RAICES, S.A. DE C.Y.		GRUPO CARSO, SOUTHWESTERN BELL, FRANCE CABLE & RAGIO	•
AUCCIONES TELEFONICAS MEXICANAS, S.A. BE C.V.		GRUPO CARGO, SCUTHWESTERN BELL, FRANCE CABLE & RADIO	•
AUCCIDNES Y CANALIZACIONES, S.A. BE C.Y.		GRUPO CARSO, SOUTHMESTERN BELL, FRANCE CABLE & FACIO	•
RIAL AKÖDS, S.A.	13-0-6-90	GRUPO CARSO, SOUTHMESTERM BELL, FRANCE CABLE & MADIO	•
A Y CLIMA, S.A.	13-Dec-90	GRUPO CARSO, SOUTHWESTERN GELL, FRANCE CABLE & RADIO	•
NTA RUEYO MUNDO, S.A.	13-Dec-90	GRUPO CARSO, SOUTHWESTERN DELL, FRANCE CABLE & RADIO	•
SCRA METICANA DE TELECOMUNICACIONES, S.A.	13-0ec-90	GRUPO CARSO, SOUTHWESTERN BELL, FRANCE CABLE & RADIO	•
TREAL AFELIADA, S.A. DE C.V.	13-Dec-90	GRUFU CARSO, SOUTHWESTERN WELL, FRANCE CABLE & RAGIO	. •
CORA MERCANTIL, S.A.	13-Dec-90	GAUPO CAASO, SOUTHNESTERN BELL, FEANCE EAGLE & FABID	•
MOVIL DIPSA, S.A. DE C.V.	13-Dec-90	GRUPO CARSO, SCUTMIESTERN BELL, FRANCE CARCE 1 REGIO	•
DE EQUIFO, S.A. DE C.V.	13-Dec-90	GAUPO CHASO, SOUTHWESTEAM BELL, FRANCE CABLE & FADIO	•
TEL, S.A. DE C.V.	13-Dec-90	GRUPO CARSO, SOUTHWESTERN BELL, FRANCE CABLE & HADID	•
CIOS Y SUPERVISION, S.A. DE C.V.	13-Bec-90-	GRUPO CARSO, SOUTHWESTERN BELL, FRANCE CARLE & RACTO	•
OMSTRUCTORA, S.A.	13-Dec-90	GRUPO CARSO, SOUTHWESTERN WELL, FRANCE CARLE & RADIO	•
DAUS DEL MORDESTE, S.A. DE C.V.		GRUPO CARSO, SOUTHWESTERN BELL, FRANCE CARLE & RADIO	•
IO DE CASASANO LA ABEJA, S.A.		LIC. FRANCISCO GARCIA GONZALEZ	9,000,00
IO EL BORADO, S.A.		CORFORACION INDUSTRIAL SUCAMA, S.A. DE C.V.	1,050.00
ata naviera minena del Golfo, S.A. DE C.V.		EAPLEADOS DE MAVIMIN, S.A. DE C.V.	25,841.10
ID LA ERIMAYERA, S.A.		SIND, TRAB. IND. ALGEARERA/UNION BE PROB. DE CARA	12,100.60
to an internal and	•• ••• ••		12,144.44
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r Ékiepphises soudi 91			1,617,707.00
r Chicarniaca aucus 15			1,411,141.00
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'A MATAMOROS, TAMPS. (VENTA DE ACTIVOS) LERGS UNIDOS DE VERACRUZ, S.A. DE C.V. 04-Jan-fi C. David Alvarel Jinémel 31-Jan-91 SRUPO SOLAMA INDUSTRIES, L.1.D. 4,622.50 54,993.10