


BANK LIQUIDITY & STABILITY IMPLICATIONS IN BARBADOS

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Hilton Barbados

Structure



Liquidity Overview & Objective

Overview

- ❑ Liquidity definition
- ❑ Institutions tend to hold excess liquidity
- ❑ The liquidity puzzle
- ❑ The role of bank liquidity in financing gov't (or crowding-out effects)

Objectives

Determine Factors that drive bank liquidity and establish a forecasting framework

Bank Network Analysis and exposure

Stress Test Analysis and Contagion Effects

Literature Highlights


Liquidity

- **Voluntary v/s involuntary**
- **Liquidity preference and determinants in LDC**
- **Empirical Approaches:** SVAR; ARDL; Pool; OLS
- **Common factors when modeling excess liquidity:**
volatility of deposits and credit; rr ratio; net currency flows; output gap; AR term


Network Analysis

- **Contagion Risks**
- **Nier et al. (2008) Framework**
network of banks (connected through interbank linkages) where parameters vary to assess the contagion impact.


Observations from the Data




Observations from the Data




Observations from the Data



Observations from the Data



Observations from the Data



Liquidity Forecasting Framework

•Augmented approach:

Agernor et al. (2004), Maynard and Moore (2006) and Khemraj (2009)

$$exl = f(\text{AR process}, rr, volX, tbr, ncg, nda)$$

... testing both homogenous and heterogeneous coefficients

... where volx is a vector of volatility variables: **cash to deposit;**
private sector credit; and output gap.

...vol variables measured by a 3 month rolling std. dev.


| Liquid Assets | | Excess Cash | |
|---------------|-------------|---------------|-------------|
| Variable | Coefficient | Variable | Coefficient |
| Constant | 9.432** | Constant | 13.024** |
| Liquidity(-1) | 0.730** | Liquidity(-1) | 0.362** |
| Liquidity(-2) | 0.132** | Liquidity(-4) | 0.137** |
| Dummy# | 9.715** | VolCD | 0.811** |
| VolCD(-3) | -0.076* | NDA(-1) | -0.007** |
| VolCD | 0.245** | NDA | 0.006** |
| VolYYT(-3) | 51.489** | Liquidity(-2) | 0.145** |
| VolPSC | -10.924** | VolCD(-1) | -0.582** |
| Liquidity(-3) | 0.072** | YYT(-6) | -13.252** |
| YYT(-6) | -8.994** | VolYYT(-3) | 72.990** |
| VolPSC(-5) | 6.394** | Liquidity(-3) | 0.129** |
| VolCD(-1) | -0.135** | | |
| VolCD(-5) | -0.139** | | |
| D(TB(-5)) | 0.255** | | |
| Liquidity(-6) | 0.040** | | |

Network Models: a simulation tool

e.g. Nier et al. (2008)

Default dynamics related to contagion through interbank links can similarly be related to the physics of flow networks

Nodes (banks) are connected to a source where an initial shock is generated and every node is assigned a 'sink' where the losses are directed to – the bank's net worth or capital



Network Models: credit & liquidity shocks

$$\sum_j x_{ji} + a_i = k_i + b_i + d_i + \sum_j x_{ij}$$

Where x_{ji} stands for bank i loans to bank j , a_i stands for bank i 's other assets, k_i for bank i 's capital, b_i are long – term and short – term borrowing (excl. interbank loans) d_i - deposits and x_{ij} stands for bank i 's borrowing form bank j

Network Models: credit & liquidity shocks

Pre-Shock
Balance Sheet

| | |
|-----------------|-----------------|
| $\sum_j x_{ji}$ | k_i |
| | d_i |
| a_i | b_i |
| | $\sum_j x_{ij}$ |

Post-Shock
Balance Sheet

| | |
|----------------------------|----------------------|
| $\sum_j x_{ji}$ | $\delta \rho x_{ih}$ |
| | k_i |
| a_i | d_i |
| | b_i |
| $(1 + \delta) \rho x_{ih}$ | $\sum_j x_{ij}$ |
| | ρx_{ih} |

Network Models: Matrix of Bank Exposure

| | Bank 1 | Bank 2 | Bank 3 | Bank 4 | Bank 5 | Bank 6 |
|---------------------------------|--------|--------|---------|---------|---------|--------|
| Holding Banks: | | | | | | |
| Bank 1 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Bank 2 | 831 | - | 15 | 209 | 781 | - |
| Bank 3 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Bank 4 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Bank 5 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Bank 6 | - | - | - | 2,184 | - | - |
| Canadian | 28,164 | 1,148 | 118,696 | 39,807 | 331,092 | 72 |
| US | 39,472 | 16,190 | 55 | 72,457 | 66,509 | 2,542 |
| European | 871 | 857 | 3,358 | 8,324 | 2,332 | 1,814 |
| Caribbean affiliates | 7,483 | 1,112 | 215 | 233,102 | 1,483 | 1,209 |
| Caribbean non-affiliates | 1,938 | 178 | - | 648 | - | - |

Network Models: Simulation

| Shocks | Minimum CAR % of Remaining Banks | Maximum CAR % | Sector CAR % | Number of Banks with CAR < 8% |
|---------------------------------|----------------------------------------|------------------|-----------------|-------------------------------------|
| Baseline | 15.35 | 23.42 | 18.33 | 0 |
| Europe | 15.04 | 23.27 | 18.12 | 0 |
| Canada | 13.64 | 20.76 | 16.07 | 1 |
| USA | 9.07 | 23.42 | 15.84 | 0 |
| Caribbean affiliates | 10.82 | 23.41 | 18.45 | 1 |
| Caribbean non-affiliates | 15.35 | 23.42 | 18.30 | 0 |
| Europe (+5%) | 15.04 | 23.27 | 18.12 | 0 |
| Canada (+5%) | 11.04 | 20.76 | 14.66 | 1 |
| USA (+5%) | 9.07 | 23.42 | 15.84 | 0 |
| Caribbean affiliates (+5%) | 10.03 | 17.66 | 14.39 | 2 |
| Caribbean non-affiliates (+5%) | 15.35 | 23.42 | 18.30 | 0 |
| Europe (+10%) | 15.04 | 23.27 | 18.12 | 0 |
| Canada (+10%) | - | 7.39 | - | 6 |
| USA (+10%) | 9.07 | 23.42 | 15.84 | 0 |
| Caribbean affiliates (+10%) | - | 7.98 | - | 6 |
| Caribbean non-affiliates (+10%) | 15.35 | 23.42 | 18.30 | 0 |

Conclusion

Objectives

Determine Factors that drive bank liquidity and establish a forecasting framework

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Stress Test Analysis and Contagion Effects

Finding

- ❑ A framework for forecasting individual bank liquidity was established
- ❑ The data shows our banking system is most vulnerable to Canadian banks
- ❑ Shocks to Canadian banks as well as the dominant bank in Barbados can trigger runs, which if persistent can lead to systemic failures.

THANK YOU

Questions & Comments Please...